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Abstract 
This paper argues that there is no such thing as the good-life in some universally valid sense that 
applies to all individuals. There is only a good-life as it attaches, as a good-life only can, to 
particular individuals. As such a good-life for a person is unknowable to others, and only somewhat 
better knowable in advance to the person themselves, while only the individual whose life it is will 
know the good-life when they encounter it. Therefore, structures and steps to bring about either the 
good-life for others in a universalizable sense or in a particular sense are deeply mistaken, and 
likely to do more harm than good, lessening the chances of an individual living a good-life.  
 
 
1. 
 
There may be such a thing as a good-life for an individual, but there is no 
such thing as the good-life that might be transferred universally across all or 
even most individuals. That there is no such thing as a universalizable good-life 
means that a good-life is a particular (specific) to the individual and unknowable 
to others, and may be largely unknowable to the individuals themselves in 
advance.1  
A terminological point. For the sake, one hopes, of clarity, in the following 
the expression ‘the good-life’ denotes some universally valid good-life that 
might be supposed definable for people in general. The expression ‘the 
good-life’ is thus used as one phrase. There are clearly many different 
conceptions of a putative the good-life in that universally valid sense.2 So it 
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1 It follows as a corollary that there is in principle no such thing as the bad-life, but only bad-lives for 
individuals. Individuals choose all sort of lives which other individuals would regard as bad-lives, but 
which are to them good-lives.  
2 One only has to consider the variety of the numerous secular and religious ideologies or 
belief-systems that incorporate a determinate putatively universally valid conception of the good-life. 
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may be perfectly possible to talk of a the good-life as referring to one of these 
possible punitively universally valid good-lives. Here ‘a the good-life’ refers to 
one of the good-lives from the set of those lives each putatively 
considered the good-life. The expression ‘a good-life’ denotes good-life 
particular to the individual. The expression ‘a good-life’ is without any 
implication that that life would form a good-life for any other individual or 
individuals. It does, however, carry the implication that whatever form of a 
good-life the individual has it need not correspond to some singular putative 
good-life and that no other good-life could be such a one for that individual. It is 
common sometimes to say that someone has found the good-life in a 
non-universalizable sense, suggesting that only one is possible even when 
individualised, when strictly speaking it might only be a good-life for them in 
that it is not the only possible good-life they might live as that individual. The 
argument here not only opposes the notion of the good-life that might be applied 
across all or most individuals, but also that there might be a good-life as some 
unique singular kind of life such that it is the only one good-life for any given 
individual. Thus, there might be a variety of good-lives an individual might find 
is a good-life for them, but in no case can there be a singular identifiable the 
good-life either in a universalizable or individual sense. For a life to be a good 
life for an individual, the only sense in which a life can be good, it does not have 
to be a phantom universalizable the good-life, but only a good-life, one out of 
various possible good-lives. Typically there will be some good-life an individual 
will find as a good-life, but it is possible, if unlikely, that there is none.  
While there may be such a thing as a good-life for an individual, we are 
almost certainly ignorant of what it will be. It is not for nothing that people talk 
of finding or discovering what is a good-life is for them as their life unfolds. The 
purpose of this essay is twofold: first, to argue that there is no such thing as a 
usefully universal or pan-individual notion of the good-life, and second to argue 
that this follows from it being the case that what constitutes a good-life may be 
understood only in relation to an individual, and that it is unknowable to others 
and indeed is largely unknowable to individuals themselves in advance, while 
only they will know what a good life is for them when it happens. There is no 
such thing as the good-life, and no-one knows for others what a good-life is for 
them; and the person whose life it is only knows rather better what a good-life 
would be for them, but only they will know if it is a good-life for them as they 
live it. 
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Yet there is no shortage of people queuing up with the intended purpose of 
prescribing and proscribing, thinking that they know what the good-life is, and 
by inference what would constitute a good-life not only for themselves but also 
for others. But not only may a good-life not be inferred from a putative the 
good-life, there is no singular defensible form that might be thought of as the 
good-life for it to be inferred from, while in addition a good-life in itself for any 
individual may not be known independently. The temptation to have a vision, 
and picture, perhaps an acted out mental play in one’s head, of some good-life 
for someone, is enormous. Moreover, people find it very hard to see their 
putative help as what it is: a determination in accordance with a pictured 
outcome. Almost no-one thinks they are doing it. Almost all think they are just 
guiding helpfully. 
This, however, very often tips over into doing things for others for their own 
good, to make sure that they live in accord with the good-life, or have a 
good-life, whether they like what is done for them or not.3 The problematic 
issue of doing things for other people’s own good is not what the argument here 
attempts to demonstrate; but the dangers inherent in it give urgency to the 
argument that there is no such thing as the good-life, for without such a 
demonstration the temptation to benign imposition follows forcefully and readily, 
while with it it should only follow with extreme doubt, caution and trepidation. 
We touch people’s lives, and we should be very cautious about what we 
thereby bring, or do not bring, about, and we should adopt the opposite of a keen 
attitude to bring about, or not bring about, perhaps based on a putative wisdom, 
some view we have of the good-life for them. Although the remarks here apply 
to all people, they perhaps apply notably more to children and young people, 
who have generally less power that adults in all sorts of ways and may be 
dragooned, often by structural features within society, and be unable to resist the 
influence of others and go their own way. Although it also obvious adults have 
often had their lives shaped with various degrees of applied force to fit some 
notion of what is deemed the good-life or a good-life. 
                                                     
3 This is beautifully expressed in the following. ‘Of all tyrannies, a tyranny exercised for the good of 
its victims may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons than under 
omnipotent moral busybodies. The robber baron’s cruelty may sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at 
some point be satiated; but those who torment us for our own good will torment us without end, for 
they do so with the approval of their own consciences….This very kindness stings with intolerable 
insult. To be ‘cured’ against one's will and cured of states which we may not regard as disease is to be 
put on a level of those who have not yet reached the age of reason or those who never will; to be 
classed with infants, imbeciles, and domestic animals.’ (Lewis, 1996). 
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The notion of a good-life here is not primarily a moral one, perhaps not even 
a moral one at all, but rather a life that brings to an individual happiness and 
satisfaction. A happy, meaningful, and satisfying life is the way a good-life is 
defined. The sense of ‘happy’ is not one of blind smiling goofy cheerfulness, nor 
is ‘satisfaction’ a matter of smugness or passive contentment, rather the terms 
connote overall an amoral sense of personal flourishing and a degree of peace of 
mind in respect of the life one has as the individual whose life it is. Whatever 
travails the life has – and all lives do – the life, for most of its span, seems 
meaningful and valuable and more than worth living to the person whose life it 
is. 
There may of course be an accidental connection to the moral if it turns out a 
highly moral life delivers a good-life in the sense defined. Some might say that a 
highly immoral life will lead to a bad-life, here taken to be the obverse of a 
good-life, that is, unhappy and unsatisfactory. This may be so in some individual 
cases, one might even hope it to be so as a matter of psychological truth and as 
reflecting a kind of moral justice. The latter point may just be wishful thinking. 
Yet it’s hard not to suppose there is some connection between a good-life and a 
morally good life in some sense. It is quite possible of course that someone finds 
their version of a good-life in precisely living a highly moral life in some way 
that may remain undefined for the purpose of the argument here, but which must 
be convincingly so for the person engaged in that life. In any case the moral 
aspect of one’s life is not, except for the very few, all there is to a life, and large 
portions of it consist of matters that are amoral, and yet of huge significance as 
to whether the life is a good-life. 
The usual view of proponents of there being some generalizable conception 
of the good-life is that there are definable core features, and that other features a 
life may have over and above those are optional filigree decorative additions that 
it may be nice to have, and may even enhance the good-life, but are not essential 
to its being the good-life, and so may be given up if needs be. This, it will be 
argued, gets things upside down. It is those additional features particular to an 
individual life that make the difference between a life being happy and one of 
satisfaction, which may seem optional marginal additions to some generally 
characterizable good-life, that make the crucial difference between a good-life 
for the individual and one that is not. This makes a life, and a good-life in 
particular, analogous to a work of art which may be improved or ruined by tiny 
seemingly inconsequential changes, rather than being something derivable from 
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an abstracted common standard to which an individual life might be compared 
and found to accord with or found wanting. 
Underlying the argument here is a plea for ignorance and hence modesty. 
Ignorance in knowing what will turn out to make any life a good-life, even one’s 
own, and certainly so in respect of the lives of others that might be seen, for 
their own good, as things to be shaped, planned, guided and manipulated and set 
on course to a good-life for them. It might be said in a commonsense way that 
just experience should teach us this. But the abundant evidence of experience 
showing these things to be true has not stopped many people thinking and acting 
generation after generation in a way that endorses the opposite. Nor are people 
often very good at learning from experience, certainly not the experience of 
others no matter how heartfeltly others may make their case – thus mistakes 
have a ghastly tendency to be repeated over and over. But pointing at experience 
in some vague way with an implied ‘look it’s true’ hardly constitutes an 
argument, despite that for some, little more by way of reflection is required in 
order to be convinced that trying to set up the or a good-life for others, and 
perhaps even for themselves if done rashly, is something to be avoided. So 
arguments are needed, and these will be presented. 
Of course, part of the problem of convincing people that there is little to be 
said by way of characterizing the good-life, or that they might know of a 
good-life for another, is that people care about other people and the lives they 
live, especially those close to them, and feel an emotional and perhaps moral 
need to take steps, even take charge, to make sure things turn out all right for 
them. As a general attitude, and except in extremis – perhaps someone just about 
to back off a cliff while attempting to get the right distance to take a photograph, 
or drive blind drunk, and similar – this should be resisted. The reason for this is 
twofold. First, there is no such thing as the good-life as a universally valid state 
characterizable for an individual. Second, to act as if there were such a thing as 
the good-life for the individual will risk greatly doing more harm than good to a 
life an individual has. It should be noted that there is no sense in which there 
might be any kind of good-life except as construed as one for an individual. 
Individuals are the ones who live lives, therefore there is no other sense in which 
good-life may applied to anything else. Will the arguments presented here stop 
people over-zealously thinking they may justifiably have a significant hand in 
shaping and determining the good-life or a good-life for others? Quite possibly 
not. But then arguments can be good and have no takers and arguments can be 
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bad and have people queuing to sign on to what they appear to demonstrate. But 
a lesson can be taken, that in this case there is an explanation, if not a 
justification, for the resistance the view here will encounter. Some of that is 
owing to non-rational facts about people that arguments find slight or no 
purchase on. Of course that applies as a generality, not just in respect of the 
arguments here concerning the and a good-life. Arguments only work against 
arguments. 
 
2. 
 
A classical antithesis of the view expressed here is that of Aristotle.4 For 
although he does not suppose there is a Good that might be the same across 
different kinds of things, different substances, he does suppose that we might 
identify a good for each kind, and do so in accordance with its function, so that 
something is good of its kind when it fulfils its function to the highest degree. 
This he applies to man. But the dubiousness of man, humankind, let alone an 
individual person, having a function that might be best exemplified is obvious 
immediately. If anything one of the distinctive features of persons in general is 
an ever-questioning, indeed self-questioning, account of what their function or 
purpose is. One might suppose that therefore a contemplative questioning life is 
humankind’s highest good – but even that is not something clearly settled by the 
very same self-questioning.5 In any case, this does not seriously impinge on 
what might be a good-life for an individual. Aristotle himself identifies the 
object of human life as being something that involves satisfaction, and points to 
happiness.6 But unlike the argument here, Aristotle is still searching for a valid 
pan-individual notion of happiness that might be connected to one kind of life, 
whereas the argument here is that there can be no such singular identifiable kind 
of life that might be validly transferred across individuals and deliver for them 
happiness and satisfaction. Happiness and satisfaction are radically individual. 
Religion of course is centrally based, setting the metaphysics to one side, on 
the conceit of knowing what is the good-life – a notion that usually confusingly 
stirs together ‘good’ in a moral sense and in an amoral sense, that is in the sense 
of the quality of that life in terms of happiness and satisfaction. It does so by a 
                                                     
4 (Aristotle 1976). 
5 Or we would all have stopped reading and thinking at Aristotle. 
6 (Aristotle 1976, 1097b22-1098a8.) 
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raft of prescriptions and proscriptions and religions have been quite willing to 
coerce others to save them from themselves when the occasion arises. Its clerics 
have literally made their living by imagining that they can and may take a stand 
as superior judges to the people who attend them on what the good-life is, and 
lay out to the benighted what they ought to do to improve themselves. If the 
arguments here are right this is a stance of astonishing, perhaps even, arrogant, 
zealous hubris, and one that more than likely may have disastrous consequences 
for the possibility of individuals attaining what for them is a good-life. The 
reaction based on the argument here should be that it is extraordinary to think 
you can do more good than harm in detailing what a good-life should be for any 
individual. It is an outlandish, perhaps monstrous, claim that one should guide 
with various degrees of force, people to live some conception of the good-life – 
which if the argument here is correct does not exist – and think that in doing so 
you will be not doing more harm, quite possibly vastly more harm, than good, to 
the possibility of individuals having a good-life that is happy and satisfying for 
them, indeed rather that one may be likely to cause them to have lives that are 
miserable and frustrated. 
It may be considered harsh, but it may be argued that anyone who thinks 
there is a valid pan-individual conception of the good-life either has not lived 
very long, or if they have lived long has not noticed what has gone on around 
them, or else is predisposed by a pervading ideology or set of beliefs to not seen 
reality as it is. This may explain some of the resistance the arguments and 
conclusions presented here might encounter. This point might be seem ad 
hominem, perhaps even offensively so. But it is arguable no more so, although 
the subject is more emotive here, than a Humean explanation as to why we 
misunderstand the nature of causation and its true source. 
 
3. 
 
The argument here overall is based on the fact that people are so individual 
that any attempt to plan, anticipate, control, or model what would be a good-life, 
a happy and satisfying one for an individual – and there are only individuals 
who actually live lives – is hopeless, and often highly harmful. This is because 
what makes someone have a happy and satisfying life is so unanticipatable, so 
particular, and so fine-grained and nuanced, and the constituents may appear to 
others as nothing of importance, indeed may not even register with others as a 
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feature of the life of someone needing to be taken into account in respect of their 
making it a good-life. 
 
4. 
 
Five arguments will be presented to support the general claim and implied 
argument that that there is no such thing as the good-life for an individual, nor 
may we know what a good-life for them may be. These I shall call (a) 
Probability and Luck Argument, (b) Individual Values Argument, (c) 
Fine-grained and Nuanced Argument, (d) After-the-Fact Argument, (e) 
Experience Argument. 
 
(a) Probability and Luck Argument 
 
The probability of our being able to anticipate let alone forecast how 
someone’s future life might go, along with what might make that life a good-life, 
is incredibly low. Yet this is required for any determinate plans for an 
individual’s good-life to have any chance of success. The point here is not just 
that we radically do not know future facts about someone’s life, we also do not 
know the future facts relevant to making it a good-life. Just too many factors, 
most of which are impossible for us to know, influence how someone’s life 
might turn out, for any actions intent on bringing about a certain determinate 
kind of life, deemed a good-life for others, to have anything but a vanishingly 
small chance of success, and therefore action attempting to bring about such a 
determinate good-life should be avoided. Luck, both good and bad, plays a part 
in this as ‘luck’ indicates things turning out certain ways because of factors that 
no-one could have reasonably anticipated let alone had any control over in a 
certain result being brought about. One must remember too that one of the 
factors making it even harder to determine what a good-life might be for 
someone is that person themselves, that is, not an external factor but the 
changing, evolving, nature of the that person. What they regard as a good-life 
for them is very unlikely to remain fixed but will itself change as they change 
and are changed by their movement through life. Again, as already hinted at, this 
argument builds on the idea of modesty and ignorance, and that to act in matters 
where knowledge is so very limited is at best vain-glorious hubris and at worst 
quite possibly culpably reckless. Moreover, given this ignorance, interventionist 
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positive action to determine a good-life for someone will not only be fraught 
with direct ever-branching forward moving lines of unintended consequences, 
things that might have happened, of which we are ignorant, might not happen, 
some of which may have been the very things that would have led an individual 
to a good-life, one that will no longer come about. That this points to things that 
would have happened if we had not acted that we will never know about has the 
unfortunate consequence of making our actions easier to justify and easier to 
live with, for it is hard to bring to the table evidence that must remain forever 
merely hypothetical and speculative of what might have been should the action 
not have been taken. One might respond that this argument could be turned on 
its head and that from inaction all the same considerations would follow. But 
this is a mistake. The difference is crucial, for with inaction there is no claim or 
pretence to being able to determine and control future events and what might be 
a good-life for someone, rather it is an acknowledgement of ignorance. Erring 
on the side of letting things be in respect of such an unknowable matter, what 
might be a good-life for someone, is justified by an extreme ignorance of what it 
might be and what might lead to it. Erring on the side of intervention in getting 
someone what one might suppose to be a good-life for them is enormously 
unjustified as it appeals to a claim to knowledge as to what a good-life for them 
is and what might lead to it that is indefensible and belied by the facts. So, there 
is no symmetry or similarity between acting and not acting when one is faced 
with a claim to knowledge in the first case and claim a to ignorance in the 
second case, for the second case is not a claim to some other kind of knowledge 
of what will happen if one does not act, but rather a claim to not knowing what 
will happen supporting inaction. Inaction in the envisioned cases is the obverse 
of action, not, as it might be interpreted, another form of ‘action’. This is 
because action here is determinate and makes epistemic claims, whereas 
inaction is indeterminate, and need not and does not, make epistemic claims 
about our outcomes – on the contrary inaction affirms a denial of those 
epistemic claims. 
As already hinted, action and inaction need not be absolute here. But 
anything that errs towards action with a claim to knowledge of the good-life 
generally or a good-life for an individual cannot be defended. We just do not 
know what it is or what will bring it about for an individual. This might seem to 
open the door for those who feel they act only moderately in respect of 
determining good-lives for others, and leave plenty of scope for the vagaries of 
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chance factors and luck. It is claimed here that very often this is not in fact the 
case, and the deterministic attempt to bring about a good-life for another when 
examined is much less modest than claimed, and errs heavily on the side of 
interventionist action when a discerning look at the situation suggests that one 
should consciously shy away from such action, and in a marked manner too, 
because of the irredeemable ignorance already referred to. 
 
(b) Individual Values Argument 
  
This holds that the values that determine whether an individual life is a 
good-life are ineradicably connected to those held by the individual, and no 
attempt to prejudge these by others is likely to be successful. One might think 
carefully what the denial of this entails: that the values others find in things, 
both positively and negatively, along with their relative distribution and 
weighting, adding up to what defines or might define a good-life for them, are 
going to be the same as those of oneself or be at least knowable with some 
degree of sureness (and here one refers back to argument (a)) by oneself. Again, 
this looks staggeringly unlikely. One must point again to the possible dire 
consequences of getting it wrong for someone, squared up with the supreme 
unlikeliness of getting it right, and draw the consequences that any attempt to 
lay down a good-life for someone is a mission not just of almost certain disaster 
but, if pursued with reflection, one of culpable arrogance. 
One should note that this argument, and the claim it leads to, is distinct from 
any claims as to whether values are individually determined or not, or indeed 
any claim about what determines values. Rather it is the claim that what works 
to make an individual’s life a good-life has to be the adopted values of the 
individual. No point about where values come from or what grounds them is 
involved in this and it is compatible with a variety of answers to the question. 
 
(c) Fine-grained and Nuanced Argument 
 
This is the defensible contention that what determines a good-life for the 
individual – reminding oneself that it is individuals who have a good-life (or a 
bad-life) in the sense of it being happy and one of satisfaction – is fine-grained 
and nuanced. What this amounts to is it not only being highly particular and not 
universalizable what determines a good-life for someone, but also that it may 
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come down to fine-grained features and considerations that will within 
themselves also qualitatively have to be nuanced a particular way. Change the 
group of things that really matter to an individual, or change the internal 
qualities of the items within the group, which will in turn change the identity of 
the whole, and they are likely to lose their effectiveness in providing a good-life. 
Crudely put, people like certain things and like those things a certain way. 
This makes it very unlikely that one will be able to get any usable sense of 
what others might put together as a set of fine-grained nuanced features and 
considerations constituting what is for them a good-life. In the end, it is the 
small things and small highly particular features of those small things that 
determine a set that makes the difference between their being ones that provide 
the right assemblage for a good-life for someone or not, and there is not really 
the remotest chance of anyone but the individual knowing what they are, or 
indeed being able to even begin to construct a set for someone. Many of the 
features and considerations will not even register for others as features and 
considerations that might constitute a good-life for some individual simply 
because they only matter to that individual and are very unlikely to matter to any 
other individual exactly as they are and thus show up as features and 
considerations relevant to constructing an individual’s good-life. 
 
(d) After-the-Fact Argument 
 
The danger of being deterministic about a good-life for others, and even too 
far in advance for oneself, is the phenomenon of convincing oneself, or trying to 
convince oneself, that the predetermined place where one ends up is where one 
should be, despite it being obvious that one is unhappy and dissatisfied with it. 
This can be hard to admit in various ways. It may be simply very difficult, close 
to impossible, to imagine changing one’s situation. One may not, because of the 
path one has taken and where one has ended up, and because of the very fact 
that one has not taken another path and ended up elsewhere, be able to 
contemplate well alternatives or how to bring them about. All the things that 
would have happened to one, to make it that one ended up elsewhere did not 
happen, and so one is not affected by any of them, making one a different person. 
In addition, any changes that one may think of making will be exposed to the 
world, including perhaps those who precipitated one to where one is, with 
putatively helpful intentions of bringing about a good-life for you, and thus to 
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make manifest defiantly that you think they were wrong can be terribly difficult. 
It might seem, among other things, ungrateful, disloyal, unloving, and carries 
with it implied criticism, perhaps blame. As the individual it can be hard to 
admit to oneself that one let oneself be led to a place in life which is ill-fitted to 
being a good-life. Hard to admit one perhaps suppressed alternative conceptions 
of a good-life and in a sense kowtowed to others. Incredibly difficult after the 
fact of one’s being where one is, to disentangle it from one’s life leading up to it 
so that one might form some alternative that is a good-life in fact suited to 
oneself. One may have a tendency to think one should be enjoying the life one 
has so wished for by others, and deny that one is not, since after all it was 
prepared for by people who supposedly care for you and regard themselves as 
wise as to what a good-life would be. Unfortunately, the latter matter, the 
wisdom, does not follow from the former, the caring intent to help, and indeed 
cannot if the ignorance argument here is correct. You need more than good 
intentions to be a good eye surgeon, and here, in the case of a good-life, 
becoming an expert is impossible because you are trying to do what only an 
individual can do for themselves. One is not only more likely to get a good-life 
right if it is by a process one has come to feeling it is a result of one’s own 
determinations, one is also more likely to think that it is a good-life merely by 
dint of it being something one has come to through one’s own determined idea 
of what a good-life is for you as an individual. If a life is not a good-life one is 
less likely to resent it and think it a better life than it is, if not quite the good-life 
one might have wanted, if one thinks that in whatever way matters to one, that it 
was at one’s own behest that one is where one is. 
 
(e) Experience Argument. What constitutes a good-life (or indeed a bad-life) 
for oneself consists of things that cannot be identified by thought alone, but have 
to be discovered by experience.7 Rather like, indeed perhaps exemplified by, 
discovering that one has a passion for music, but comparatively little interest in 
football. There is no a priori thought process or intellectual reflection that is 
going to show you that conclusion. One has predilections, and there is no way 
they can be divined by thought, by ideas and arguments. They are non-rational 
features of oneself, and one may very well not come to realize well or fully what 
they are across a whole life, let alone towards its beginning so that it might be 
                                                     
7 Something of Bergson’s distinction between ‘intellect’ and ‘intuition’ may be said to be in play here. 
See (Bergson 1991). 
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used as a source to deterministically circumscribe a good-life (avoiding a 
bad-life) for oneself later. It is something one learns about oneself as one goes 
along. If that is true, then it is even more, indeed greatly more, unlikely that 
others will be able to know what these predilections are or what kind of life, 
regardable by the individual whose life it is as a good-life, might be. In order for 
the constituents of what might constitute the good-life for an individual to be 
accessed, made up of the very feel of a certain kind of life in all its fine-grained, 
nuanced, internally interactive complexity, one must be the person whose life it 
is. No-one else can do that for us; no-one else should purport to, or set 
themselves up, as doing that for us. Of course, as has been said, most people 
who do that for others would either disagree that they cannot know best for 
others, but they are mistaken for the reasons given here, or they deny, despite 
what they do obviously constituting knowing best for others, that that is really 
what they are doing. 
 
5. 
 
It will not have gone unnoticed that in the course of the discussion and 
arguments, the reference has been mostly to determining and bringing about a 
good-life for others. In fact some of the same considerations apply to oneself, 
but to a lesser degree. This may seem surprising, and contradictory, given that so 
much of the case is placed on the individual alone being able to determine what 
needs to be involved in a good-life for them. But this appearance is easily 
explained, and the explanation does not help the case for those who might 
over-determine a good-life for others, rather the opposite. The reason that the 
same considerations apply to oneself is that oneself changes over time, and that 
one’s future self if not as inaccessible to that same self as it is to others, is to an 
extent unknown, and therefore should be treated as ‘other’ in respect of what 
features and considerations will produce a good-life. This defect in knowledge 
about oneself helps the determiner of a good-life for others not one jot, but 
rather adds – indeed it has already been alluded to above – another layer of 
unknowability to what an individual is going to be like, in addition to the 
unknowability of determining a good-life’s constituents for any other individual 
taken in snapshot at any moment in time. This leaves one to conclude that the 
same kind of caution apply to what features and considerations will determine a 
good-life for oneself as applies to determining it for others. Not to same degree, 
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not to same extent, but still the ignorance is there. But one can see an argument 
for not doing things are irrevocable, although time passing can make them so 
(no-one is going to become a world-class cellist taking up the instrument at 
fifty), but there is nothing anyone can do about that. 
 
6. 
 
We try to form and shape our life as best we can so that it turns out to be 
something like a good-life for us. A life that is happy and gives satisfaction. This 
stands as a virtual truism. Given the uncertainty of things beyond our control, 
which at the same time are often unpredictable, such a shaping is difficult 
enough in our own cases, exacerbated by our proceeding through life being one 
of not only honing what will truly give us a good-life but also honing our faculty 
whereby we know better what might give us a good-life. A difficult enough task 
in our own case, and one of immense complexity. A hopeless task in the case of 
another. And in the case of others highly likely to do more harm than good as the 
chance of getting it wrong is vastly greater. The conclusion is that we should not 
accept, or be very wary indeed about, anyone who claims to know what the 
good-like is for people, and even more so what a good-life is for an individual. 
That ‘good-life’ only attaches meaningfully to individuals entails that talk of the 
good-life for people in general is meaningless. Meaningless and dangerous, for 
it ignores and rides roughshod over what can only be a matter of a good-life, that 
life as it is for the individual whose life it is. This sounds hubristic enough in our 
own case, and inviting a fall, but at least then we are the ones who carry most of 
the consequences – although there will be those around us to whom we should 
be obliged to give thought. In the case of anyone claiming to know what the 
good-life is for others, quite apart from the matter of it quite likely transgressing 
the freedom of others to determine their own lives and form a good-life, one 
should, it is argued, react with the view that it is almost certainly false and with 
an equal degree of certainty dangerous for the well-being of others. That people 
have a good-life is, one might contend, the most important thing for them. What 
is the case in respect of it really matters. Over-prescription and epistemic 
hubristic, sometimes culpable intentions – although perpetrators are rarely able 
to see themselves as such – are the greatest threats to it. If there was ever a 
warning from history, from life, indeed from philosophical reflection, this is it.  
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7. 
 
There is no implication in what is said here that when others interfere less, 
people left to their own devices will be guaranteed in fact to find a good-life. 
The point is not that, but rather only that the individual whose life it is will know 
a good-life for them when they see it, so to speak, and no-one else can judge that 
for them, whether they in fact find a good-life or not. 
We can no more judge a good-life for other individuals than judge what kind 
of music they will like or even if they will like music much at all. Indeed, the 
individual whose life it is will equally, by analogy, not know until after 
experience what kind of music he or she likes or whether music is important to 
them in their life, or what kind of friends they will prefer or indeed encounter, or 
what job they will come to think would niche-like suit them, or whether they 
like going out and travelling a lot or whether they prefer to stay mostly at home. 
These are not add-ons to someone’s like, they are their life. We have no idea of 
what people will encounter or how on being encountered it will be regarded by 
them, nor to what extent how they regard things will determine what they further 
encounter through the decisions they make, affecting where and when they are 
in the world, and then further how what they encounter will feed back into how 
they regard things. We just do not know. We discover these things as we go 
through our lives. And yet all these matters are what forms the life of someone 
and informs whether it will be a good-life for them or not. 
The upshot of the view here points to two sides having a part to play in 
determining a good-life for any given individual. One side is for others to admit 
ignorance and be modest and not be overly deterministic as to the good-life for 
other individuals or a good-life for anything given individual. The other side, on 
the part of the individual whose life it is, it is a matter not only of proceeding, 
because of relative ignorance, in a piecemeal fashion8 through one’s life in 
constructing something like a good-life for oneself, but also of propagating the 
wherewithal to defy others in their conception of the good-life as a general valid 
                                                     
8 Without wanting to make too much of the analogy, one might say that what has been said to apply to 
society applies to the individual. That one should proceed piecemeal with changes and not according 
to some vast overall plan, and this because of our necessary ignorance at any given time and overtime. 
One finds these arguments not only in (Popper 1974), but also pervading those of the Austrian School 
of Economics. One might say that the individual is like a society determined by the complexities of the 
price mechanism, whereas to plan things for others looks like ignoring the knowledge that can only 
come from that internal price mechanism, which nothing in fact can substitute for. 
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pan-individual notion and defy others as required in respect of what it is that 
would constitute a good-life for oneself. This not only suggests a strong will, but 
also a high degree of emotional honesty about oneself that one is not afraid to 
follow through and support, perhaps, by argument. 
This does not mean that one should not be open to the advice and 
suggestions of others, but one must make positions and arguments one’s own, 
and resist positively merely taking on the influence of others unquestioned.9 
Nor does anything said here entail that one cannot learn both theoretically and 
empirically from the lives of others, from their success and their mistakes 
(failures), but it is entailed that in order to harness these to help one to have a 
good-life one has to shape those features of other’s lives to fit one’s own 
predilections and sensibilities – one is looking at the particular features of the 
lives of others, and one has to make what one may learn from them, particular 
and specific features for oneself and one’s own life, and this has to be done 
piecemeal, with no overarching guide to the good-life. 
Nothing in what has been said implies that one will get what one wants in 
life, that is a good-life, but it does imply that one has a greater probability of 
bringing it about if one is left to your own judgement on the matter rather than 
following the judgement of others, and that if you get it, get to a good-life, only 
you will know it when you see it. 
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